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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IN MARYLAND 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Barker 
v. Wingo, Maryland appellate courts have enforced more 
rigorously the right of criminal defendants to a speedy 
trial. This article surveys the application and treatment 
of the Barker criteria by the Maryland courts in recent 
decisions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution! and article 21 
of Maryland's Declaration of Rights2 guarantee a criminal de-
fendant the right to a speedy trial. Until recently, there were few 
occasions when the appellate courts of Maryland vigorously en-
forced this right.s During the past year and a half, however, :five 
dismissals of criminal charges have been granted or affirmed on 
the ground that the State failed to provide the defendants with 
a speedy trial.4 This turnabout by Maryland's appellate courts 
appears to represent a belated, strict interpretation of the guide-
lines established by the Supreme Court in 1972 in Barker v. 
Wingo. 1I 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 
(1967), which held that the sixth amendment speedy trial right is incorporated 
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and thus applicable to 
the states. 
2. MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 21. 
3. For a thorough discussion of the history of the speedy trial privilege in Mary-
land, see State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 283 A.2d 160 (1971). 
4. Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 350 A.2d 628 (1976); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 
345 A.2d 62 (1975); State v. Smith, 31 Md. App. 328, 356 A.2d 328 (1976); 
Evans v. State, 30 Md. App. 423, 352 A.2d 343 (1976); State v. Wynn, 26 Md. 
App. 39, 336 A.2d 800 (1975). 
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In addition to the Barker decision, one factor that has 
probably influenced the Maryland appellate courts is the Federal Speedy Trial 
Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3161 et seq., passed in 1974 and effective July 1, 1976, which 
provides fixed time limits between arrest and indictment, indictment and arraign-
ment, and arraignment and trial. The time limits will decrease each year up 
through 1979 and will eventually allow only 100 days between arrest and trial. 
If the time limits are not met, the sanction called for is dismissal of the charges. 
In deciding whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice, the court 
must consider the seriousness of the crime, the factors leading to the dismissal 
and the impact of a reprosecution upon the administration of justice. Although 
the Act does not apply to the states and although no mention of the Act was 
made in any of the five dismissals cited in note 4 supra, it is likely that the Act 
has had a strong influence on the Maryland decisions. This may be inferred from 
the fact that the first of these decisions occurred very soon after the passage of 
the Act. There is also a Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1976), 
which requires that within 2 weeks after arraignment a trial date must be set, 
and the date cannot exceed six months from the time of arraignment. Some dis-
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This article will briefly address the history of speedy trial in 
Maryland before Barker and analyze the effect and construction of 
the Barker criteria as they were applied in the aforementioned 
recent dismissals. The conclusion will project what the future may 
hold for Maryland speedy trial litigation. 
II. PRE-BARKER ERA IN MARYLAND 
Before Barker, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered the 
speedy trial issue on twenty-five occasions, granting only one dis-
missal.G During this same period, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals decided that the accused had been denied his right to 
a speedy trial on two of sixty-five occasions.7 Several of the earlier 
cases held that the accused waived his right to a speedy trial by 
failure to make a demand for trial.s Other cases decided that the 
speedy trial right did not apply to the period of time prior to arrest 
or indictment.9 Still others concluded that the right to a speedy 
trial did not apply to delays in the entertainment and disposition 
of motions for a new trial,lO appeals,l1 or defective delinquency 
determinations.12 
Throughout most of the pre-Barker era, no objective criteria 
were established by the Maryland courts for the determination of 
cretion is permitted with regard to postponements. Since the Section was enacted 
in 1971, its effect has been diminished by the court of special appeals, holding that 
the provision is directory rather than mandatory. State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 
306, 295 A.2d 779 (1972). 
6. Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599, 217 A.2d 367 (1966). See State v. Lawless, 13 
Md. App. 220, 226 n.4, 283 A.2d 160, 166 n.4 (1971), for the period of time prior 
to October of 1971, the date of the Lawless decision. There were no speedy trial 
cases in the court of appeals between Lawless and the June, 1972 Barker decision. 
7. Caesar v. State, 10 Md. App. 40, 267 A.2d 750 (1970) and Wilson v. State, 8 Md. 
App. 299, 257 A.2d 553 (1969). See State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 226 
n.4, 283 A.2d 160, 166 n.4 (1971), for the period of time prior to Lawless. There 
were seven speedy trial cases in the court of special appeals between Lawless 
and Barker: Young v. State, 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137 (1972); Thompson 
v. State, 15 Md. App. 335, 290 A.2d 565 (1972); Carter v. State, 15 Md. App. 
242, 289 A.2d 837 (1972); State v. Hamilton, 14 Md. App. 582, 287 A.2d 791 
(1972) ; Bowie v. State, 14 Md. App. 567, 287 A.2d 782 (1972); Kelley v. State, 
14 Md. App. 287, 286 A.2d 806 (1972); Hoss v. State, 13 Md. App. 404, 283 
A.2d 629 (1971). 
8. See, e.g., the general discussion of waiver in Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 296--
99, 71 A.2d 36, 40-41 (1950), which is the classic waiver case in Maryland. In 
Harris there was a failure on the part of the accused to demand a speedy trial 
at any time. For a case in which there was a timely demand followed by a failure 
to reassert the demand, see State v. Murdock, 235 Md. 116,200 A.2d 666 (1964). 
For a discussion of the various types of waiver cases and an exhaustive listing 
of these cases, see State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 228 n.8, 283 A2d 160, 
167-68 n.8 (1971). 
9. State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 228 n.9, 283 A.2d 160, 167-68 n.9 (1971). 
10. ld. at 230 n.10, 283 A.2d at 168 n.10. 
11. ld. at 230 n.11, 283 A.2d at 168 n.11. 
12. ld. at 230 n.12, 283 A.2d at 168 n.12. 
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whether the speedy trial right had been denied an accused.13 In 
1965, however, an article discussing the problems involved in 
dealing with speedy trial suggested the now accepted "four-factor" 
analysis to determine whether or not a defendant's right to a 
speedy trial had been violated.14 The four factors suggested in 
that discussion were: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for 
the delay; (3) prejudice to the accused; and (4) waiver by the 
accused.15 
The four-factor analysis was first applied in Maryland by the 
court of special appeals in Hall v. State.16 In Hall, the court held 
that several affirmative acts by the accused constituted a waiver 
of his right to a speedy trial,u Judge Thompson, writing for the 
court, ruled that if an accused waives his right to a speedy trial, 
he is precluded from a later assertion that the right was violated.1s 
The court of special appeals noted, however, in Fabian v. State19 
that if the waiver resulted merely from the accused's failure to 
assert the right to a speedy trial, the defendant would not be 
precluded from subsequently asserting the right if he could show 
that a delay caused by the State resulted in his suffering actual 
prejudice.20 Absent such a showing, a failure to demand trial 
constituted a waiver of the right and determined the speedy trial 
question, regardless of any other factors.21 
Thus, at the time Barker was decided, Maryland had at least 
superficially already adopted a version of the four-factor test. The 
Maryland appellate courts, however, employed no well-defined 
analytical techniques in applying the factors to individual situa-
tions. Maryland also subscribed to the demand-waiver doctrine 
under which a defendant is considered to have waived his right 
for any period of time prior to which he has not demanded trial. 
This doctrine was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in 
Barker.22 
13. Prior to the adoption of the four-factor test in Hall v. State, 3 Md. App. 680, 
240 A.2d 630 (1968), the Maryland courts treated each case on an ad hoc basis. 
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599, 217 A.2d 367 (1966); Harris v. State, 194 
Md. 288, 71 A.2d 36 (1950). 
14. Note, The Lagging Right To A Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587 (1965). 
15. ld. at 1590. 
16. 3 Md. App. 680, 240 A.2d 630 (1968). 
17. These acts included several collateral motions by the accused. There was a 
removal from Baltimore to Montgomery County and one request for a postpone-
ment. The court held that each of these delaying actions constituted a waiver 
of speedy trial for the period during which they took place. ld. at 686-87, 240 
A.2d at 634-35. 
18. ld. at 686, 240 A.2d at 634. 
19. 3 Md. App. 270, 239 A.2d 100 (1968). 
20. ld. at 286, 239 A.2d at 111. 
21. ld. 
22. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra. 
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III. BARKER V. WINGO 
Prior to its decision in Barker v. Wingo,23 the Supreme Court 
had dealt infrequently with the sixth amendment right to a speedy 
trial and had not established any guidelines for determining when 
the right had been violated.24 In his concurring opinion in Dickey 
v. Florida,25 Mr. Justice Brennan criticized the Court for not 
having "trace [d the] contours" of this most basic constitutional 
right.26 Justice Brennan enumerated the "basic factors" which 
should be considered and then engaged in a lengthy discussion of 
these factors.27 
Thus, the Barker Court faced the speedy trial question with no 
precedential objective guidelines to follow. In Barker, the peti-
tioner, Willie Mae Barker, and Silas Manning were arrested 
shortly after a murder in July of 1958. Kentucky officials chose to 
try Manning first, believing a conviction of Barker would be 
impossible without the testimony of Manning. Consequently, the 
Commonwealth sought and was granted a number of postpone-
ments while it made an effort to convict Manning. Meanwhile, 
Barker remained in jail for ten months before he was released on 
bond.28 When the Commonwealth sought a twelfth postponement 
23. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
24. ld. at 515. See also Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opmlOn in Dickey v. 
Florida, 398 U.S. 30,40-41 (1970). The Supreme Court case most often cited in 
connection with speedy trial prior to Barker was Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 
77 (1905). There were several indictments against petitioner for various crimes. 
Consequently, there were delays in trying the petitioner on all of the crimes. 
In dealing with the speedy trial issue, the Court said that the right is a rela-
tive one - consistent with delays and dependent upon circumstances. It was 
found that there is no denial of the speedy trial right when the trial of 
one indictment is delayed pending another trial in a different jurisdiction. An-
other case cited by Justice Brennan in Dickey was United States v. Ewell, 383 
U.S. 116 (1966), in which the respondents were convicted of narcotics violations. 
The indictments were subsequently dropped. New complaints were issued and 
respondents were rearrested and reindicted. Respondents moved for a dismissal 
due to the lack of a speedy trial after a total of 19 months had elapsed since the 
date of their original arrest. A federal district court granted the motion. The 
Supreme Court spoke primarily in terms of prejudice, holding that there had 
been no demonstration of prejudice. Based on this lack of prejudice, the Court 
reversed the dismissals of the several indictments that had been pending. Beavers 
and Ewell are but two examples of what Justice Brennan was referring to 
when he complained that no speedy trial guidelines had ever been enunciated. 
In each case, the reasoning and analysis was such that it would only be mean-
ingful precedent in cases with similar fact situations. Justice Brennan thus pro-
posed that more widely applicable standards be established by the Court at the 
next available opportunity. 
25. 398 U.S. 30, 39-57 (1970). 
26. ld. at 40-41. 
27. I d. at 48. The three factors Mr. Justice Brennan set out were: 1) the source of 
the delay; 2) the reasons for the delay; and 3) whether the delay prej udiced 
interests protected by the sixth amendment. 
28. Barker thereafter remained out on bond until after his conviction. 
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in February, 1962, Barker objected through counsel for the first 
time and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he had been 
denied a speedy trial. This motion came three and one-half years 
after the initial arrest. 
Manning was finally convicted in the fall of 1962 and, shortly 
thereafter, the Commonwealth moved to set a trial date for Barker. 
Two more postponements were granted due to the illness of the 
arresting officer, a chief prosecution witness. The trial was finally 
held in October of 1963 and, with Manning testifying for the prose-
cution, Barker was convicted and given a life sentence. His appeal, 
based, inter alia, on speedy trial claims, was denied by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals.29 
In February, 1970, Barker was denied habeas corpus relief in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
district court's denial of habeas corpus was affirmed.30 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.3! Barker presented, and the Court seized 
the opportunity to establish criteria for dealing with speedy trial 
issues. The Court adopted a version of the four-factor test. 
In a general discussion of the right to a speedy trial, Justice 
Powell's majority opinion distinguished this "generically different" 
right from those other rights aimed at protection of the accused 
in a criminal case. The discussion noted the interest that society 
has in promptly trying those accused of committing crimes and 
pointed out that delays often worked to the accused's advantage by 
enabling him to bargain more successfully with the state. The 
cost of pretrial incarceration and the loss of earned wages also 
were mentioned as societal interests which are compromised by 
lengthy delays.32 
The Court rejected two alternatives that had been suggested 
"as ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts 
experience in protecting the right to a speedy trial."33 The first 
of these - a fixed time period after which the right to a speedy 
trial has been violated per se - was dismissed because the Court 
felt the adoption of such a rule should be a legislative rather than 
a judicial function.34 The second suggested alternative was the 
so-called "demand rule" or "demand-waiver doctrine." Under this 
rule, an accused "waives any consideration of his right to a speedy 
29. 385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964). For a more detailed recitation of the Barker fact 
situation, see 407 U.S. at 516-19 and Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial 
Gets A Fast Shuffle, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 1376, 1376-78 (1972). 
30. 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971). 
31. 404 U.S. 1037 (1972). 
32. 407 U.S. at 519-22. 
33. ld. at 522-23. 
34. ld. at 523. 
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trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial."35 
The Court rejected this doctrine, based on the premise that a waiver 
of a constitutional right must be intelligent, voluntary and in-
tentional.36 
The Court then adopted a four-factor balancing test for the 
analysis of speedy trial cases: 
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach 
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more 
than identify some of the factors which courts should as-
sess in determining whether a particular defendant has 
been deprived of his right. Though some might express 
them in different ways, we identify four such factors: 
Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.3T 
"The length of delay," said the Court, "is to some extent a 
triggering mechanism."3s In other words, there must be some sig-
nificant delay "dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the 
case" before the balancing process is begun.39 
In using the balancing process, different weights should be ac-
corded to different reasons for the delay. While deliberate delay 
by the prosecution for the purpose of "hamper [ing] the defense" 
should weigh heavily in the accused's favor, other reasons such as 
"negligence or overcrowded courts" should be viewed in a more 
neutral light and "a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should 
serve to justify appropriate delay."40 
With respect to the defendant's responsibility to assert his 
right, the Court noted that failure to assert the right is not deter-
minative but merely one of the factors to be weighed in the balanc-
ing process.41 
The fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, was considered 
by the Court in light of the defendant's interests to be protected. 
Disadvantages to the defendant caused by pretrial delay were dis-
cussed, with particular emphasis on pretrial incarceration, mental 
anguish and the possibility of an impaired defense.42 
35. !d. at 525. 
36. ld. 
37. ld. at 530. As pointed out by the Court, id. at 530 n.30, there is little difference 
between the criteria set out in Note, The Lagging Right To A Speedy Triol, 
supra note 14, the factors discussed by Justice Brennan in Dickey enumerated in 
note 27 mpra, and the four factors as set out in Barker. 
38. 407 U.S. at 530. The length of delay is also one of the factors considered in the 
balancing process. 
39. ld. at 530-31. 
40. I d. at 531. 
41. ld. at 531-32. 
42 ld. at 532-33. 
1976] Speedy Trial 53 
The Court commented on how the balancing process should be 
carried out: 
We regard none of the four factors identified above as 
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a 
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are 
related factors and must be considered together with such 
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these 
factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still en-
gage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But 
because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the 
accused, this process must be carried out with full recog-
nition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is spe-
cifically affirmed in the constitution.43 
The Court initiated the balancing process in Barker by noting 
that the five year delay was "extraordinary,"44 and that only seven 
months of the delay could be "attributed to a strong excuse" - a 
missing prosecution witness.45 Four years of the delay occurred 
due to the Commonwealth's inability to convict Manning. Although 
Barker spent ten months in jail and was forced to live "for four 
years under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety," the Court felt that 
"prejudice was minimal" because no witnesses died and there were 
no apparent lapses of memory which affected the outcome.46 
Finally, and most importantly, the Court believed that Barker was 
not at all anxious to be tried. Instead, Barker gambled on 
Manning's chances for acquittal, which would undoubtedly have 
resulted in the dismissal of the charges against Barker.41 
In the Court's view, the "minimal prejudice" and the defendant's 
lack of forceful assertion of his right outweighed the length and 
causes of the delay. The Court held that Barker's right to a speedy 
trial was not denied.48 
Justice Powell's opinion in Barker has been criticized by some 
for lacking specificity with regard to application of the four factors. 
As one author noted: 
The decision cannot be criticized because no rigid rule was 
established, for we cannot expect hard edges defining con-
stitutional rights .... But Mr. Justice Powell does more 
than opt for a flexible standard; in well ordered para-
graphs, he essays instruction concerning the governing 
43. Id. at 533. 
44. Id. The balancing process mechanism was thus triggered and the first factor 
established. 
45. Id. at 534. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 535-36. 
48. Id. at 536. The balancing process employed in Barker is discussed further in 
connection with the post-Barker Maryland cases considered in Section IV, infra. 
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factors. His analysis of these factors proves less than grati-
fying. The result is a right debilitated, its components 
askew.49 
This criticism was expanded with regard to the four factors: 
It is the Court's discussion of these factors and their inter-
relationship that Mr. Justice Powell's opinion fails to slake 
the thirst for authoritative instruction.50 
Regardless of the merits of this criticism, the guidelines estab-
lished in Barker were at least a step in the right direction of safe-
guarding the sixth amendment right. 
IV. THE FOUR FACTORS AND THE BALANCING PROCESS: 
POST-BARKER ERA IN MARYLAND 
There have been twenty-eight speedy trial decisions in Mary-
land since Barker.51 Initially, despite Barker, there was no ap-
parent refining of Maryland's approach to this issue. Only very 
recently did the Maryland courts seriously apply Barker, with 
ultimate dismissals in State v. Wynn,52 Epps v. State, 53 Smith v. 
49. Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets A Fast Shujfie, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 
1376 (1972). 
50. Id. at 1383. 
51. The issue has been decided twenty-five times since Barker in the court of special 
appeals: Grandison v. State, 32 Md. App. 70S, 363 A.2d 523 (1976); Lee v. 
State, 32 Md. App. 671, 363 A.2d 542 (1976); Davis v. State, 32 Md. App. 318, 
360 A.2d 467 (1976); Isaac v. State, 31 Md. App. 604, 358 A2d 273 (1976); 
State v. Smith, 31 Md. App. 328, 356 A.2d 328 (1976); Daniels v. State, 30 Md. 
App. 432, 352 A.2d 859 (1976); Evans v. State, 30 Md. App. 423, 352 A.2d 343 
(1976); Ward v. State, 30 Md. App. ll3, 351 A.2d 452 (1976); Jones v. State, 
29 Md. App. 182, 348 A2d 55 (1975); State v. Wynn, 26 Md. App. 39, 336 A.2d 
800 (1975); Erbe v. State, 25 Md. App. 375, 336 A.2d 129 (1975); State v. 
Becker, 24 Md. App. 549, 332 A.2d 272 (1975); Matthews v. State, 23 Md. App. 
59, 325 A.2d 897 (1974); Bell v. State, 22 Md. App. 496, 323 A.2d 677 (1974); 
Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 243 (1974); Davidson v. State, 18 
Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d 474 (1973); Fowler v. State, 18 Md. App. 37, 305 A.2d 
200 (1973); State v. Jones, 18 Md. App. ll, 305 A.2d 177 (1973); McIntyre v. 
State, 17 Md. App. 526, 302 A.2d 672 (1973) ; Collins v. State, 17 Md. App. 376, 
302 A.2d 693 (1973); State v. DuBose, 17 Md. App. 292, 301 A.2d 32 (1973); 
Williams v. State, 17 Md. App. 110, 299 A.2d 878 (1973); Sylvester v. State, 
16 Md. App. 638, 299 A.2d 129 (1973) ; Miller v. Warden, 16 Md. App. 614, 299 
A.2d 862 (1973); State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 306, 295 A.2d 779 (1972). The 
court of appeals has decided the speedy trial issue three times since Barker: 
Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 350 A.2d 640 (1976); Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 
350 A2d 628 (1976); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975). In Jones 
v. State, 29 Md. App. 182, 348 A.2d 55 (1975) (Davidson, J., dissenting), there 
was a lengthy discussion of the very complicated fact situation. After applying 
the balancing process, the court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The 
decision has been appealed to the court of appeals and certiorari was granted. 
The oral arguments were heard in September, 1976 and the decision should be 
forthcoming shortly. 
52. 26 Md. App. 39, 336 A.2d 800 (1975). 
53. 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975). 
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State 54 (hereinafter referred to as Lee Smith), Evans v. State,55 and 
State v. Smith56 (hereinafter referred to as William Smith). 
A. The Four Factors 
1. Length of Delay 
In the Barker opinion there was a very limited discussion of 
the length of delay factor. As expressed by Justice Powell, "[u]ntil 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no 
necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the bal-
ance."57 This language indicated that the delay period necessary 
to trigger the balancing process varies according to the circum-
stances of each case.58 
Wynn,59 decided in 1975, was the first of the "dismissal cases." 
The period of delay in Wynn began in December, 1969 with Wynn's 
arrest and ended in April, 1974 when the indictments were dis-
missed. Citing Barker and State v. Jones,60 the court of special 
appeals found the fifty-two month delay to be of "constitutional 
dimension." Thus, the court "must view the facts and circumstances 
in the light of the other three factors .... "61 
In its discussion of the length factor in EppS,62 the court of 
appeals mentioned that the accrual time begins from "the date 
on which the defendant became 'an accused' ... up until the date 
he was tried."sa Relying on Barker, the court held that the one 
year, fourteen day delay in Epps was "sufficiently inordinate to 
constitute a 'triggering mechanism'."64 
In Lee Smith,65 the court of appeals reasoned that, inasmuch 
as a delay of slightly more than one year was sufficient to activate 
the triggering mechanism in Epps, the sixteen month delay ex-
perienced by Smith would, a fortiori, be sufficient to require inquiry 
into the other factors.66 By its language, the court implied that 
any delay greater than the one year, fourteen day delay in Epps 
would be of constitutional dimension and would automatically 
initiate the balancing process. In attempting to further clarify the 
54. 276 Md. 521,350 A.2d 628 (1976). 
55. 30 Md. App. 423, 352 A.2d 343 (1976). 
56. 31 Md. App. 328, 356 A2d 328 (1976). 
57. 407 U.S. at 530-31. 
58. !d. at 531. 
59. 26 Md. App. 39, 336 A2d 800 (1975). 
60. 18 Md. App. 11, 305 A.2d 177 (1973). 
61. 26 Md. App. at 41, 336 A2d at 802. 
62. 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975). 
63. ld. at 109, 345 A.2d at 71. 
64. ld. at 111, 345 A2d at 72. 
65. 276 Md. 521, 350 A.2d 628 (1976). 
66. ld. at 528, 350 A.2d at 633. 
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length issue, the Lee Smith court said that the length of delay, 
in addition to being a triggering mechanism, should also "be given 
some, but not determinative weight" in the balancing process 
itself.67 
Following the Lee Smith and Epps rationale, the court of special 
appeals found that the eighteen month delay in Evans was also "of 
constitutional proportion."6s 
In William Smith,69 there was a delay of nearly four years 
from the time of Smith's arrest until the date that the indictment 
was dismissed due to the lack of a speedy triaPO The State con-
ceded in its brief that "[t]he delay ... is clearly long enough to be 
presumptively prejudicial."71 After citing Epps and Barker, the 
court of special appeals proceeded with its treatment of the other 
factors without further discussion of the length factor.72 
In the dismissal cases, the Maryland courts have apparently 
ignored Justice Powell's words in Barker. The opinion in Barker 
stated that "the length of delay that will provoke ... an inquiry 
[into the other factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar 
circumstances of the case."73 Before the dismissal cases, Maryland's 
courts appeared to be properly interpreting the instructions set 
forth in Barker. For example, the court of special appeals in 
Matthews v. State74 found that a delay of one year was not of 
constitutional dimension "under the circumstances of this case."75 
Several months later, however, the same court found that a nine 
and one-half month delay was constitutionally significant in State 
v. Becker.76 These two cases exemplify the interplay which should 
exist between the length of delay and the other circumstances of 
the case. Despite these decisions, and despite the language in 
Barker, when Epps, Lee Smith and Evans are read together, the 
Maryland courts seem to have quantified the length factor by the 
rule that any length of delay greater than one year will auto-
matically require that the balancing process be entered into, re-
gardless of the other circumstances existing in the case. 
67. [d. 
68. 30 Md. App. 423, 427, 352 A.2d 343,346 (1976). 
69. 31 Md. App. 328, 356 A.2d 328 (1976). 
70. [d. at 331-32,356 A.2d at 330. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. 407 U.S. at 530-31. 
74. 23 Md. App. 59,325 A.2d 897 (1974). 
75. [d. at 65, 325 A.2d at 901 (emphasis added). The circumstances included a five 
month period in which no motion for a speedy trial had been filed. There was 
also one instance in which the accused failed to appear in court while out on bail. 
76. 24 Md. App. 549, 332 A.2d 272 (1975). 
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2. Reason For The Delay 
In the Maryland decisions immediately after Barker, the courts 
.generally did not engage in any extensive analyses of the reason 
factor.77 However, in its 1975 decision in State v. Becker,78 the 
·court of special appeals accorded the reason factor greater im-
portance. In Becker, the reasoning was thorough and extensive and 
included a chronological recitation of the record from the beginning 
-of the prosecution until the charges were dismissed.79 In weighing 
the various reasons for the nine and one-half month delay, the 
·court noted that there was no intentional delay caused by the 
State but that a portion of the delay had been caused by the State's 
negligence.so The "heart of the problem" was the period of delay 
.attributed to the inability of Becker to secure the attendance of 
. several key witnesses.s1 The prosecution had agreed to assist 
Becker in this effort, as he was proceeding pro se, but failed to 
render effective assistance. The delay due to these circumstances 
'was apparently weighed against the State by the trial judge.82 
The court of special appeals held this to be error. The State 
.should not have been assisting "the man it was prosecuting" in a 
-function that his attorney would have had the duty to perform 
:had the right to counsel not been waived: 
We think the appellee [Becker] must equally share respon-
sibility with the State whose wrongful conduct was no more 
than ineffective, but well intentioned aid.83 
In Wynn, the State was unable to locate its witnesses for a 
period of four years. A concerted five day effort after this four 
:year period resulted in the State's location of the missing wit-
nesses.S! As the court said, "[i]t is reasonable to infer that both 
-witnesses could have been located readily at any time."s5 Although 
this reason was considered to be on the "neutral side," the court 
ruled that the "negligence and lack of due diligence" on the part 
oof the State over such a long period of time could have been inde-
:pendently determinative of the speedy trial issue.s6 
77. See, e.g., Sylvester v. State, 16 Md. App. 638, 299 A.2d 129 (1973). 
78. 24 Md. App. 549, 332 A2d 272 (1975). 
79. This chronological listing is not new. As early as State v. Hall, 3 Md. App. 680, 
240 A.2d 630 (1967), a similar list was included in the opinion. 
80. 24 Md. App. at 561, 332 A2d at 279-80. 
81. !d. at 563, 332 A.2d at 280. 
·82. ld. 
83. ld. 
84. 26 Md. App. at 42, 336 A.2d at 802 . 
. 85. ld. 
-86. ld. 
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In Epps, the court of appeals took a slightly different stance in 
its evaluation of the reason for delay factor. There were three 
co-defendants who were originally to have been tried without a 
jury on December 28, 1972-approximately five months after Epps" 
arrest. This period was held to be clearly" 'chargeable to the' 
State'."87 On the day set for trial, Epps' two co-defendants re-
quested a jury trial. Epps objected and through counsel, asked 
" 'to be tried today and separately'." The State argued for post-
ponement of the entire case and the trial judge agreed, reschedul-
ing trial for April 13, 1973. In so doing, he added: 
I don't think your clients have any cause to complain that 
they have been denied a speedy trial since they are the 
cause of this postponement.S9 
The April trial did not occur on the scheduled date but was post-
poned until June 12, 1973, the next available trial date. After one-
final "neutral" postponement, the trial was held in late August, 
1973. 
The court of appeals held the span of time between December 
28, 1972 and June 12, 1973 to be the "critical period."90 In its· 
discussion of the reason factor, the court disagreed with the trial 
court and concluded: 
the entire period [December 28, 1972 through June 12, 
1973] was caused by 'governmental action' - by both the 
courts and the prosecutors; none of it may be considered 
as having been 'neutral', none of it certainly is attributable 
to the appelIant.91 
Lee Smith involved a total delay of sixteen months. Included in 
this period was a six week psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, 
an unexplained six month period from the time the defendant was 
pronounced fit for trial to the date set for trial, a five month delay 
caused by the State's negligence in failing to locate the prosecutrix 
until several days prior to the trial, a two week delay for a further 
psychiatric examination which resulted in a postponement for two 
months until the next available trial date, and a three week delay 
caused by the arresting officer's being out of the country.92 
The court of appeals stated that every postponement after the 
first medical examination was attributable to the State, "[c]on-
sequently we must carefully scrutinize the justifications assigned 
87. 276 Md. at 111,345 A.2d at 73. 
88. ld. at 99,345 A.2d at 66. 
89. ld. at 100,345 A.2d at 66 (emphasis in the original). 
90. Id. at 112, 345 A.2d at 73. 
91. Id. at 117, 345 A.2d at 75-76. 
92. 276 Md. at 522-26, 350 A.2d at 630-32. 
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by the state for each ensuing delay."93 The six month period that 
occurred after the first medical exam was unexplained. Smith had 
not complained, however, so whatever the reason, it was not to be 
weighed too heavily against the State.94 The five month delay 
which ensued was crucial to the determination of a lack of a speedy 
trial. Prior to the trial date, the State discovered that the prose-
cutrix could not be located, so the trial which was scheduled for 
Monday, June 11th, 1973, was postponed on the preceding Friday. 
On Friday evening, just hours after the postponement was granted, 
the State was able to locate the prosecutrix. Yet the State made no 
effort to try to reset the trial but rather, remained silent on the 
matter.95 Nor was there any effort by the prosecution to ex-
pedite this case. Consequently, the new trial date was set for five 
months later. During that period, Smith's mental condition 
deteriorated further and another delay was necessary for him to 
receive another mental evaluation. He was again pronounced fit 
and a new trial date was set.96 This trial was also postponed 
because the arresting officer was unavailable.97 Thus, the post-
ponement from the first trial date which was caused by the State's 
negligence had a snowballing effect and, consequently, the re-
mainder of the delay was chargeable to the State.9S 
Evans reduced the analysis of the reason factor to simple 
mathematics. The first portion of the eighteen month delay was 
due to the failure of the arresting officer to appear on six different 
occasions for scheduled preliminary hearings. The trial court dis-
missed the charges after the fifth failure but Evans was subse-
quently reindicted. Following the indictment, there was a series 
of essentially administrative delays totalling approximately twelve 
months. Of this period, all but two months was charged to the 
State. Upon reciting these facts, the court of special appeals tersely 
recapitulated its finding and concluded by stating that the "state 
is chargeable with delay in a ratio seven and a half times that 
chargeable to the appellant."99 There was no discussion as to 
whether the time chargeable to the State was for valid reasons, 
reasons to be weighed neutrally, or for reasons that should be 
weighed heavily against the State. 
In William Smith, the most recent dismissal case, the court of 
special appeals avoided the ratio analysis which had been intro-
duced in Evans only two months before. The discussion of the 
93. ld. at 529, 350 A.2d at 633. 
94. I d. at 529, 350 A.2d at 633-34. 
95. ld. at 523-25, 350 A.2d at 630-31. 
96. ld. at 525,350 A.2d at 631. 
97. !d. 
98. ld. at 531, 350 A.2d at 635. 
99. 30 Md. App. at 429, 352 A.2d at 348. 
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reason factor only dealt with the amount of time "chargeable" to 
the State and the amount "chargeable" to Smith.loo The court found 
that the State was responsible for twenty-eight months of the delay 
while Smith was charged only with seven months. The remaining 
ten months of delay were due to neutral reasons.lOl Again, as in 
Evans, the court made no attempt at "weighing" the different 
reasons beyond determining which party was at fault.lo2 
In light of the Evans and William Smith decisions, it seems 
certain that the court of special appeals has not adhered to Justice 
Powell's instruction with regard to the analysis of the reason 
factor. The method of merely determining which party was at 
fault for the various periods of delay and then comparing the total 
time chargeable to each was clearly not what Justice Powell had 
in mind when he suggested that "different weights should be 
assigned to different reasons."103 
3. Prejudice 
The Supreme Court in Barker identified three of the interests 
of the defendant which the speedy trial right "was designed to 
protect": the prevention of "oppressive pretrial incarceration;" 
the minimization of anxiety and concern on the part of the accused; 
and the protection of the accused's right to assist counsel in the 
preparation of the defense.lo4 The Court noted that the most serious 
problems arise when the last of these interests is not protected, 
because "the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his 
case skews the fairness of the entire system."105 
In reversing an order dismissing an indictment in State v. 
Becker,106 the court of special appeals stated that it is not essential 
that the defendant affirmatively demonstrate prejudice since preju-
dice is but one factor to be considered in the balancing process.107 
This thought, briefly mentioned in Barker, was expanded upon by 
the Supreme Court in Moore v. Arizona.los Moore held that no 
actual prejudice need be shown by the defendant when challenging 
the denial of his constitutional right, particularly when the length 
of the delay is "inordinately long."lo9 Indeed, the burden may well 
shift to the State to affirmatively prove lack of prejudice.110 
100. 31 Md. App. at 331-32, 356 A.2d at 330. 
101. ld. 
102. ld. 
103. 407 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). 
104. ld. at 532. 
105. ld. 
106. 24 Md. App. 549,332 A.2d 272 (1975). 
107. ld. at 566,332 A.2d at 282. 
108. 414 U.S. 25 (1973). 
109. ld. at 26-27. 
110. ld. 
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In Wynn, the defendant did not show prejudice resulting from 
a delay in excess of four years. According to the court of special 
appeals, when the delay is "patently inordinate, ..• it is for the 
state to make an affirmative showing of no prejudice."lll 
The court of special appeals discussed the prejudice factor in 
Evans, including pretrial incarceration and the resulting mental 
anguish therefrom, but there was no affirmative finding of preju-
dice.1l2 Seemingly the prejudice was presumed to exist. 
Actual prejudice of varying degrees was established in the 
other three dismissal cases, Epps, Lee Smith and William Smith. 
In Epps, the accused was incarcerated from the time of his arrest 
until his trial slightly over a year later because he was unable to 
make bail.us In addition, a key defense witness available to testify 
on the date originally set for trial was unavailable when the trial 
was held eight months later, due to his being stationed overseas 
in the military service.ll4 Thus, the keystone of Epps' defense was 
"obliterated" when the trial court granted a postponement of the 
original trial date notwithstanding Epps' objection and insistence 
that he be tried immediately.ll5 
Lee Smith, like Epps, presented a situation in which the de-
fendant suffered significant pretrial incarceration - nine months 
out of the total sixteen month period of delay.1l6 Furthermore, 
the preparation of Smith's defense was at least minimally impaired 
due to the five month period chargeable to the State during which 
Smith's mental condition was such that he was unable to assist 
counsel.ll7 Finally, Smith suffered some degree of financial ruin 
and "his family was forced onto the public welfare rolls ... ," a 
situation which surely affected, to some degree, Smith's "anxiety 
and concern. "118 
William Smith also suffered prejudice in two ways. First, al-
though the facts of the case are somewhat vague, it is clear that 
Smith was in jail for at least thirteen months awaiting trial on 
these charges.119 In addition, an alibi witness died thirty-two 
111. 26 Md. App. at 42, 336 A.2d at 802. 
112. 30 Md. App. at 429-30, 352 A.2d at 348. 
113. 276 Md. at 99, 119,345 A.2d at 65, 77. 
114. ld. at 100, 119-20,345 A.2d at 66,77-78. 
115. ld. at 120, 345 A.2d at 77. 
116. 276 Md. at 532-33, 350 A2d at 635. 
117. ld. at 533, 350 A.2d at 636. 
118. ld. at 533, 350 A.2d at 635. 
119. 31 Md. App. at 330, 356 A2d at 330. It appears from the facts that Smith was 
in the Washington, D.C. jail serving a sentence for an unrelated crime at the 
time of his original indictment. From there he was sent to a federal prison in 
Kentucky for a further period. Smith was delivered from this institution to 
Prince George's County pursuant to a writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum. 
It is at that point in time that the 13 month pretrial incarceration period began. 
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months into the delay period.120 Thus, Smith was subjected to two 
of the types of prejudice specifically mentioned in Barker.12l 
Thus, while demonstrations of actual prejudice, including pre-
trial incarceration, unavailability of defense witnesses, inability to 
assist counsel and financial hardship, have weighed heavily in three 
of the dismissal cases, a showing by the defendant of actual preju-
dice is not essential to a finding that the speedy trial right has 
been denied. In the two cases in which dismissals were granted 
without proof of prejudice, it was said that prejudice may be pre-
sumed from extraordinary delay. More accurately, perhaps, the 
longer the delay attributable to the State, the less the burden is 
on the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. Indeed, when the delay 
is particularly long, the State may be burdened with showing a 
lack of prejudice, or rebutting a presumption of prejudice. 
4. Waiver 
The waiver-assertion factor appears to be mired in confusion 
in Maryland at the present time. In the past, Maryland firmly 
adhered to the demand-waiver doctrine which, simply stated, pro-
vided that a criminal defendant waived his speedy trial right by 
failing to assert it affirmatively.122 There were many Maryland 
cases before Barker in which this doctrine was applied and none 
resulted in a finding that an accused was denied his right to a 
speedy triaJ.123 The confusion now exists because the Supreme 
Court in Barker specifically rejected the demand-waiver doctrine 
on the theory that a failure to make a demand cannot constitute 
"an intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege."124 
The Court further held that the courts should "indulge every rea-
sonable presumption against waiver."125 After a thorough dis-
cussion, the Court disposed of the doctrine: 
We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails 
to demand a speedy trial forever waives the right. This 
does not mean, however, that the defendant has no respon-
sibility to assert his right. We think the better rule is that 
the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right 
to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in 
an inquiry into the deprivation of the right.126 
120. ld. at 331,336 A.2d at 330. 
121. 407 U.S. at 532. 
122. E.g., State v. Murdock, 235 Md. 116, 123, 200 A.2d 666, 669-70, cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 914 (1964). 
123. ld. 
124. 407 U.S. at 528. See also text accompanying notes 35-36, supra. 
125. 407 U.S. at 525. 
126. I d. at 528. 
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Inasmuch as the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is 
applicable to the states, it would appear that the Court's unequivo-
cal rejection of demand-waiver would apply to the states as well. 
However, there is a serious question as to whether the Maryland 
courts agree.127 For example, in a post-Barker case, Williams v. 
State,128 petitioner's motion for dismissal due to the lack of a speedy 
trial was denied by the trial court. The court of special appeals 
affirmed on the ground enunciated by the trial court, that defend-
ants had waived their right to a speedy trial by not demanding 
it until the day their trial was to begin.129 
In Lee Smith, the court of appeals stated: 
[T]he decisions of the United States [Supreme] Court, in 
reference to the corresponding provisions of the Federal 
Constitution, in this case, the sixth amendment, are adopted 
by the [Maryland] court as authority which is very per-
suasive, although not necessarily controlling.130 
In a footnote, the court noted that since the accused had made 
numerous requests for a speedy trial, no decision would have to be 
made as to whether the earlier demand-waiver cases in Maryland 
"are still viable."131 
Erbe v. State,132 decided on the same day as Lee Smith, ex-
pressed a similar view. Erbe involved a very lengthy post-con-
viction delay in sentencing. In a discussion of the pre-Barker 
demand-waiver cases in Maryland, the court also dealt with the 
interplay between the Maryland and Federal rights to a speedy 
trial. It was concluded that for the purposes of its decision in 
127. The Maryland position is difficult to understand in light of the Supreme Court's 
language in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). In Klopfer, the 
Court quoted Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965), in which the sixth 
amendment right of confrontation was held to apply to the states pursuant to the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
[T]he protection of the confrontation guarantee [like other sixth amend-
ment rights], is to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those federal 
rights against encroachment. 
386 U.S. at 222-23. The Court went on to say that the right to a speedy trial 
is as fundamental as other sixth amendment rights. Thus, by analogy, the same 
vigor with which the Court enforced the right of confrontation in Pointer should 
be applied to the speedy trial right. 
128. 17 Md. App. 110,299 A.2d 878 (1973). 
129. ld. at 118,299 A.2d at 882. 
130. 276 Md. at 526, 350 A2d at 632 (emphasis added). 
131. ld. at 527 n.2, 350 A.2d at 632 n.2. 
132. 276 Md. 541, 350 A.2d 640 (1975). 
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Erbe, the court would treat these rights as coterminous.1ss The 
court of appeals then stated that it was possible to render a de-
cision in the case by considering only the other factors.134 
Thus, the language in Lee Smith and Erbe raised a question as 
to whether the Maryland courts still adhere to the demand-waiver 
doctrine. Unfortunately, the court of appeals was not required to 
decide the issue in either case.13D Perhaps Judge O'Donnell's con-
curring opinion in Lee Smith will guide the court in the future. 
As he saw the problem, 
[the Court] seem[s] to suggest the view that in Maryland 
the demand-waiver doctrine 0 • 0 may still be of continuing 
force and effect ..•. [However, it should be clear that as] 
a result of the decision in Barker v. Wingo, it appears to 
be no longer open to question that the demand-waiver doc-
trine heretofore applied by this Court. 0 • has been repudi-
ated and that such a demand is no longer a condition prece-
dent to the application of the right.136 
In Evans, the court of special appeals, while not expressly 
doing so, apparently adopted Judge O'Donnell's thinking on the 
subject. Judge (now Chief Judge) Gilbert, in writing for the court, 
said that "the failure to demand does not, ipso facto, amount to a 
waiver of that fundamental right. Instead, failure to demand is 
relegated to the status of '0 •• another factor to be considered in 
interaction with the three others 0 0 • .' "137 
The William Smith decision did not mention the assertion factor 
in the recitation of the facts but only stated that Smith "made 
numerous pro se motions for a speedy trial . 0 • throughout his 
period of incarceration in Prince George's County."138 From this 
language, it can be presumed that no waiver issue arose in this case. 
It appears that at least the court of special appeals abides by 
the holding in Barker which rejected demand-waiver. Until a case 
involving the demand-waiver issue reaches the court of appeals, 
however, it cannot be said with certainty what Maryland's position 
is on the issue. 
133. I d. at 546, 350 A.2d at 643. 
134. I d. at 544-46, 350 A.2d at 642-43. 
135. There was no assertion issue in Smith because of his many demands for a speedy 
trial. In Erbe, the court concluded that although there was no demand for sen-
tencing, the case could be decided without dealing with the demand-waiver issue. 
136. 276 Md. at 536, 350 A.2d at 637-38. 
137. 30 Md. App. at 430-31, 352 A.2d at 349, citing State v. Jones, 18 Md. App. 11, 
305 A.2d 177 (1973). 
138. 31 Md. App. at 331, 356 A.2d at 329. 
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B. The Balancing Proces8 
In accordance with Barker, the Maryland courts have avoided 
the application of any hard and fast rules in carrying out the 
balancing process. The dismissal cases suggest, however, that a 
delay of more than one year between accusation and trial may 
ipso facto, trigger inquiry into the other factors.1S9 The shortest 
period to date which has precipitated a balancing resulting in dis-
missal is one year and fourteen days.140 Whether a shorter period 
will suffice remains to be seen. Once the weighing process was 
initiated, each of the dismissal cases was considered in the light 
of the particular factual situation presented. 
For example, in Wynn, the court based its holding that there 
had been a denial of the right to a speedy trial primarily on two 
factors.l4l The first of these was the fifty-two month delay. The 
length would not have been determinative if the reasons for the 
delay had been justified.142 In Wynn, the lengthy delay was due 
to missing state witnesses - a valid reason according to Barker.14S 
The State was guilty of negligence, however, as the missing wit-
nesses were found after comparatively little effort. The length 
and reason factors coupled with the presumption of prejudice 
sufficiently outweighed the fact that Wynn never demanded that 
he be tried.144 
Lee Smith and Epps presented similar applications of the bal-
ancing process. The length of delay in both cases extended more 
than one year.145 As pointed out in Lee Smith, in addition to 
triggering the investigation into the other factors, the length of 
delay "should, by itself, be given some, but not determinative, 
weight."146 Although the circumstances were somewhat different, 
a substantial portion of the delay in each case was chargeable to 
the State. In Epps, eight months of the total delay was caused by 
the trial court's refusal to try Epps separately after his two 
co-defendants demanded a jury trial on the morning that all three 
were to be tried non_jury.147 Approximately seven months of the 
total delay in Lee Smith occurred due to the State's negligence in 
failing to locate the prosecutrix and in failing to expedite the 
139. See Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 528,350 A.2d 628, 633 (1976). 
140. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 111,345 A2d 62,72 (1975). 
141. Although the court mentioned in its summary that all four factors were favorable 
to the defendant, the discussion centered around the length and reason factors. 
142. 26 Md. App. at 41, 336 A2d at 802. 
143. 407 U.S. at 531. 
144. 26 Md. App. at 40, 336 A2d at 801. 
145. In Smith, the delay was approximately sixteen months. 276 Md. at 528, 350 A2d 
at 633. The delay in Epps was one year, fourteen days. 276 Md. at 111, 345 
A.2d at 73. 
146. 276 Md. at 528, 350 A2d at 633. 
147. See text accompanying notes 87-91, supra. 
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case once the witness was located.us In both cases, these delays 
weighed heavily against the State. 
Both Smith and Epps suffered actual prejudice. Each was jailed 
for significant amounts of time while awaiting trial.149 In addition, 
Smith's mental condition deteriorated during the delay to such an 
extent that he was incapable of assisting counsel in his defense.1M 
Epps suffered prejudice in that his chief alibi witness was unavail-
able at the time of trial due to the State-caused delay.1I51 Thus, 
harmful prejudice was shown in both cases. 
There arose no demand-waiver issue in either case. Both 
defendants demanded a speedy trial on the date of the first postpone-
ment, and each made several subsequent demands.152 
In both cases, therefore, there were substantial periods of delay 
most of which were caused by the State; each accused suffered 
some degree of actual prejudice; and each made frequent and timely 
demands for a speedy trial. Hence, the cases were dismissed. 
Evans was a closer case than the other dismissal cases. As in 
the other three, the delay of eighteen months in Evans assumed 
"constitutional proportion."153 No actual prejudice was shown, 
however, but it was presumed due to the length of the delay. Also, 
no demand was made by Evans for a speedy trial until the day of 
his triaJ.154 The determinative factor in Evans was the reason for 
the delay.ll111 Five postponements were necessary because of the 
failure of the prosecuting officer to appear in court. Several other 
delays were caused by court congestion and administrative prob-
lems.I116 Lack of diligence on the part of the State in prosecuting 
the accused emerged as the deciding factor. The court of special 
appeals stated that: 
On balance, in this case, the appellant's failure to demand 
a speedy trial prior to the date of trial, while weighing 
against him, does not outweigh what appears to be an air 
of indifference with respect to the prosecution of this case 
from its inception.lIIT 
148. See text accompanying notes 92-98, supra. 
149. Smith ,was in jail for nine months before being released on bond. 276 Md. at 
532-33, 350 A.2d at 635. Epps was incarcerated for the entire period between his 
arrest and trial. 276 Md. at 119, 345 A.2d at 77. 
150. 276 Md. at 533, 350 A.2d at 636. 
151. 276 Md. at 120,345 A.2d at 77. 
152. Smith made four separate demands for a speedy trial, the first coming on the 
date of the first postponement. 276 Md. at 532, 350 A.2d at 635. A similar 
situation occurred in Epps, 276 Md. at 117-18, 345 A.2d at 76. 
153. 30 Md. App. at 427, 352 A.2d at 346. 
154. ld. at 429-30,352 A.2d at 348. 
155. ld. at 430-31,352 A.2d at 349. 
156. See the chronological listing of the various periods of delay and the reasons, 30 
Md. App. at 427-28, 352 A.2d at 347. 
157. 30 Md. App. at 431, 352 A.2d at 349. 
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There was a very limited application of the balancing process 
in William Smith. As in Epps and Lee Smith, all four factors 
weighed against the State being permitted to prosecute the accused. 
There was a total pretrial delay period of nearly four years,158 
an overwhelming proportion of the delay was chargeable to the 
State,159 actual prejudice to the accused was affirmatively demon-
stratedl60 and Smith made numerous demands for a speedy trial.l6l 
With all of these factors weighing against the State, the court 
perfunctorily dismissed the case. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland courts have taken great strides in the protection 
of this most fundamental constitutional right - the right to a 
speedy trial. Maryland's appellate courts have recently applied 
the Barker balancing test with vigor and may have gone further 
than Barker required. In the author's opinion, the recent dismis-
sal cases suggest that, if either of Maryland's appellate courts were 
confronted with the Barker fact situation, the charges would have 
been dismissed. A Maryland application of the four-factor test to the 
Barker fact situation might proceed as follows: A delay of five 
years is constitutionally significant and sufficiently triggers the 
balancing process.162 The reasons for delay varied, but none of it 
may be charged to Barker. More than four years of the total five 
year delay ,was caused by the State's desire to convict Barker's 
alleged accomplice.163 The remainder of the delay was incurred 
because of a neutral reason - a missing state witness.164 Thus, the 
ratio of the delay is four years chargeable to the State, no time 
chargeable to Barker and approximately one year of neutral delay. 
With respect to prejudice, Barker,161i like EppS,t66 Lee Smithl67 and 
William Smithl68 involved a substantial period of pretrial incar-
ceration - ten months in Barker as compared to one year in Epps, 
nine months in Lee Smith and thirteen months in William Smith. 
Maryland courts have also pointed out that when there is a par-
ticularly long delay, prejudice can be presumed and no actual 
prejudice need be shown.169 The final factor, demand for trial, 
158. 31 Md. App. at 331-32, 356 A.2d at 330. 
159. !d. 
160. !d. at 331, 356 A2d at 329. 
16l. ld. 
162. See text accompanying notes 52-76, supra. 
163. 407 U.S. at 517. 
164. ld. at 517-18. 
165. 407 U.S. at 517. 
166. 276 Md. at 111, 345 A2d at 73. 
167. 276 Md. at 528, 350 A2d at 633. 
168. 31 Md. App. at 331-32, 356 A2d at 330. 
169. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 276 Md. at 532, 350 A.2d at 635. 
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would probably tip the scales in Barker's favor in the Maryland 
courts even though Barker was silent during the first three and 
one-half years following his arrest.no In Maryland, assuming argu-
endo that demand-waiver is still in effect,171 Barker may have 
waived his right to a speedy trial for this three and one-half year 
period. During the subsequent twenty month period, however, 
Barker made numerous demands for a speedy trial, a period suffi-
cient to constitute a denial of speedy trial.172 Thus, the two factors 
which seemed to weigh most heavily against Barker in the Supreme 
Court - waiver and prejudice - are the two factors which would 
ultimately result in a dismissal if the case arose in Maryland. 
Where will the Maryland courts go from here? Again, one can 
only speculate, but the trend toward stricter enforcement of the 
speedy trial right as evidenced in the dismissal cases, is apt to 
continue. With federal legislation such as the Speedy Trial Act 
placing direct pressure on the federal courts, it is likely that similar 
mandatory legislation may eventually be forthcoming in Maryland 
as well. Perhaps the courts sense this and, as a result, are attempt-
ing to prepare our trial courts so that the transition will be orderly 
rather than chaotic. 
George Church 
ADDENDUM 
Since the initial printing of this article, there have been two 
more "dismissal" cases in Maryland. The more significant of the 
two is Jones v. State, No.3 (Ct. App., Dec. 14, 1976) (discussed 
briefly in note 51, supra), in which the court of appeals reversed the 
court of special appeals' decision upholding Jones' conviction. The 
defendant in the case, John Edward (Liddy ) Jones, was convicted 
of narcotics violations after a two and one-half year pretrial period. 
In its discussion of the reason factor, the court of appeals 
avoided the strict mathematical analysis espoused by the court of 
special appeals in Evans v. State (see discussion at p. 59, supra) : 
While we must scrutinize the entire interval between arrest 
and trial, and attempt to ascribe the reasons for particular 
delay, it is not possible or even desirable to do so with 
mathematical precision. 
The court ultimately decided that of the total two and one-half 
year delay, eighteen months "were largely the result of [Jones'] 
170. 407 U.S. at 517. 
171. See discussion in Section IV, A (4), supra. 
172. 407 U.S. at 517-18. 
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own actions." There was a crucial eleven month period, however, 
which "was attributable substantially if not entirely to the State's 
dilatoriness." The court termed the State's attempt to excuse this 
delay as "nothing more than a concocted diaphonous smoke screen." 
The court concluded this portion of the analysis by finding that 
the delays caused by Jones and by neutral factors in no way miti-
gated the eleven month delay attributable to the State. 
The assertion factor was also weighed in favor of Jones because 
he and his attorneys made numerous requests for a speedy trial, 
beginning early in the pretrial period. 
In dealing with the prejudice factor, the court noted that no 
affirmative showing of prejudice is required. The court found 
that Jones had suffered no actual prejudice even though two wit-
nesses died, because the deaths occurred prior to the crucial period 
of delay. In addition, the court briefly mentioned the mental angu-
ish suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Murphy asserted that 
the State's dereliction in failing to try Jones during the crucial 
period was not so gross as to warrant the reversal ordered by the 
majority. In his view, the decision "should serve as a bitter lesson 
to prosecutors and judges throughout the state not to risk playing 
Russian roulette with the public'S right to have criminal defendants 
brought to the bar of justice on a timely basis." 
In contrast to Jones, Pyle v. State, No. 139 (Ct. Sp. App., 
Dec. 3, 1976) presented a very simple fact situation in which the 
State waited eleven months to try the defendant. The primary 
significance of the case is that the total length of delay which 
triggered the balancing process was eleven months, slightly less 
than the one year, fourteen day delay in Evans v. State, the shortest 
period until Pyle which had triggered the four-factor analysis. 
